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Introduction
1.  Article XII of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention1 (BTWC) states that:
Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by
a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the
Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be
held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to
assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention,
including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being
realized.  Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological
developments relevant to the Convention.
Review Conferences of the BTWC have been held in 1980, 1986, 1991 and 1996 with the
Fifth Review Conference to be held from Monday 19 November to Friday 7 December 2001.
2.  At the Fourth Review Conference in 1996, the States Parties adopted the provisional
agenda2 which the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend.  This was the agenda of
the Third Review Conference with the addition of a new agenda item entitled "12.
Consideration of the work of the Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Conference in
1994." The central items of the agenda were thus:
10.  Review of the operation of the Convention as provided for in its article XII
(a) General debate
(b) Articles I - XV
(c) Preambular paragraphs and purposes of the Convention
 together with the new item:
12.  Consideration of the work of the Ad Hoc Group established by the Special
Conference in 1994.
                                                
† A shorter version of this paper has been published as Opportunities for the Fifth Review Conference in
UNIDIR Disarmament Forum, Biological Weapons: From the BWC to Biotech, four, 2000. pp. 27-31.
1United Nations, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, General Assembly resolution 2826
(XXVI), 16 December 1971.
2United Nations, Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/CONF.IV/1, 1 November 1996.
23.  As at previous Review Conferences, background documents were provided by the
Secretariat providing information submitted by individual States Parties:
BWC/CONF.IV/2 Background information on the participation of States Parties in
the agreed confidence-building measures (CBMs) 1992-1996 (Secretariat)
BWC/CONF.IV/3 Background information document on compliance by States
Parties with all their obligations under the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction (Secretariat including information provided by
Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, India, Italy, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Ukraine, and
United Kingdom).
BWC/CONF.IV/3/Add. 1  Additional background information provided by South
Africa, Sweden, Turkey and United States of America.
BWC/CONF.IV/3/Add. 2  Additional background information provided by Germany.
BWC/CONF.IV/3/Add. 3  Additional background information provided by China.
BWC/CONF.IV/3/Add. 4*   Background paper on new scientific and technological
developments relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and
on Their Destruction (Secretariat including information provided by Cuba, Finland,
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States of America.
BWC/CONF.IV/3/Add. 4/Add. 1 Additional background information on new
scientific and technological developments provided by Sweden.
BWC/CONF.IV/3/Add. 4/Add. 2 Additional background information on new
scientific and technological developments provided by Germany.
The information provided by States Parties in the above documents ranges from a single
sentence to several pages of detailed information.
4.  As usual, the Final Declaration3 of the Fourth Review Conference consisted of some
opening paragraphs followed paragraphs under the individual headings of the Preamble, each
individual Article of the Convention and of "Consideration of the work of the Ad Hoc Group
established by the Special Conference in 1994."  The entire Final Document from the Fourth
Review Conference is available on the UN website at Geneva at http;//www.unog.ch/disarm/
review/bintro.htm and the Final Declaration is reproduced in the Annex to this paper.
                                                
3United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, 25th November - 6th December 1996, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.IV/9  Available at at
http;//www.unog.ch/disarm/ review/bintro.htm
35.  Insofar as the topics to be considered by the Fifth Review Conference in 2001 are
concerned, the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference included under Article XII
the following paragraph:
2. The Conference decides that the Fifth Review Conference shall consider, inter
alia, 
- The impact of scientific and technological developments relating to the
Convention;
- The relevance of the provisions of, and the implementation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention on the effective implementation of the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention, duly taking into account the degree of
universality attained by such conventions at the time of the Fifth Review
Conference;
- The effectiveness of confidence-building measures as agreed at the Second
and Third Review Conferences;
- The conclusions of a Special Conference, to which the Ad Hoc Group shall
submit its report, including a legally-binding instrument to strengthen the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which shall be adopted by
consensus, to be held as soon as possible before the commencement of the
Fifth Review Conference; and further action as appropriate;
- The requirement for, and the operation of, the requested allocation by the
United Nations Secretary-General of staff resources and other requirements to
assist the effective implementation of the relevant decisions of the Fourth
Review Conference;
These are similar to but differ in detail from the corresponding provisions agreed in the Final
Declaration of the Third Review Conference4 which stated that:
2. The Conference decides that the Fourth Review Conference shall consider, inter
alia, 
- The impact of scientific and technological developments relating to the
Convention;
- The relevance of the provisions of, and the implementation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention on the effective implementation of the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention;
- The effectiveness of coordinated confidence-building measures as agreed in
this Final Declaration;
                                                
4United Nations, Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, 9th - 27th September 1991, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.III/23
4- The report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on Verification as
well as the conclusions of a special conference, if it is convened earlier;
- The requirement for, and the operation of, the requested allocation by the
United Nations Secretary-General of staff resources and other requirements to
assist the effective implementation of the relevant decisions of the Third
Review Conference, and in particular of the confidence-building measures;
- In the light of these considerations and of the provisions of Article XI,
whether or not follow-up action is called for to create further cooperative
measures in the context of Article V or legally binding improvements to the
Convention, or a combination of both.
The central items of the Agenda can thus be expected to be the individual Articles of the
Convention and the preambular paragraphs and purposes of the Convention together with
consideration of the work of the Ad Hoc Group.
6.  The Final Declarations of the successive Review Conferences have enabled the States
Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to extend their understandings of
the Convention and thereby strengthen the prohibition regime for biological and toxin
weapons.
7.   For the Fourth Review Conference the University of Bradford Department of Peace
Studies and the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva produced and distributed to
delegations a Briefing Book5 entitled "Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:
Key Points for the Fourth Review Conference".   This paper is the first in a new series of
Review Conference Papers that will be prepared for and distributed to the delegations to the
Fifth Review Conference.
Opportunities for the Fifth Review Conference
8.  The Fifth Review Conference in 2001 provides real opportunities for the States Parties to
extend their understandings of the Convention which through being reflected in the Final
Declaration thereby strengthen the prohibition regime for biological and toxin weapons.  At
the two-week (and therefore shorter than the previous three-week Review Conferences)
Fourth Review Conference in 1996, States Parties were much aware of the ongoing Ad Hoc
Group negotiations of a Protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the
implementation of the Convention and considerable care was taken, and rightly so, to do
nothing which might impede the work of the Ad Hoc Group6.   Now, 5 years later, much
attention has been focussed on the Protocol negotiations which are now close to completion
with the principal elements of the Protocol elaborated and detailed in the text7.   The
                                                
5Graham S. Pearson & Malcolm R.Dando (eds), Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention:  Key Points
for the Fourth Review Conference, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, ISBN 1 85143 152 7,
November 1996.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
6Malcolm R. Dando & Graham S. Pearson, The Fourth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention:  Issues, Outcomes, and Unfinished Business,  Politics and the Life Sciences, 16 (1), pp.
105-126, March 1997.
7United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/55, 1 March 2001, Geneva.
5outstanding issues are now apparent8 and will be resolved during the next few months as the
Ad Hoc Group brings its negotiations to a close.   It is now timely to begin to look ahead to
the 21st Century and what else needs to be done to strengthen the Convention.
9.  There are several issues that need to be addressed that emerge from the Protocol
negotiations as some of the proposed, but thus far not agreed -- and unlikely to be agreed --,
language would have the effect of modifying the scope of the Convention which would go
beyond the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group which is limited to a legally-binding instrument to
strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention.  The
opportunity is provided by the Fifth Review Conference to extend the understanding of the
Convention by States Parties so that these issues -- such as pests and vectors and the
definition of hostile purposes -- that have emerged from the Protocol negotiations can be
addressed in the Final Declaration of the Review Conference in much the same way that the
issue of use was successfully addressed at the Fourth Review Conference.  Other issues arise
from the review of any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the
Convention required under Article XII of the Convention.   All of these will need to be
addressed in the Article by Article review of the Convention by the States Parties during the
Review Conference.
10.  For clarity it is useful here to consider these issues according to the Article under which
they could be considered at the Fifth Review Conference.
Article I   
11. The basic prohibition of the Convention is enshrined in the general purpose criterion of
Article I under which the States Parties undertake never in any circumstances to develop,
produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes.
At the Fourth Review Conference the Final Declaration reaffirmed that the Convention
unequivocally included "all microbial and other biological agents or toxins, naturally or
artificially created or altered, as well as their components, whatever their origin or method
of production of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective
or other peaceful purposes."
12.  It will be necessary, and appropriate, for the review of new scientific and technological
developments to consider what advances might usefully be specifically referred to in the Final
Declaration in order to ensure that there are no perceived omissions or exclusions which
might be exploited in a way that is inconsistent with the objectives and purposes of the
Convention.  It is interesting to note how the language regarding scientific and technological
developments has developed in successive Review Conferences.  Thus at the First Review
Conference in 1980, the Final Declaration9 in respect of Article I simply stated that:
                                                
8Graham S. Pearson, Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Progress in Geneva,
Quarterly Review no 12, CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue No. 49, September 2000, pp. 13-23.
9United Nations, First Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, 3rd - 21st March 1980, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.I/10
6The Conference believes that Article I has proved sufficiently comprehensive to have
covered recent scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.
By the Second Review Conference in 1986, the Final Declaration10 contained stronger
language:
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic
engineering and biotechnology, and the possibilities of their use for purposes
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that
the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such
developments.
The Conference unequivocally applies to all natural or artificially created microbial
or other biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production.
Consequently, toxins (both proteinaceous and non-proteinaceous) of a microbial,
animal or vegetable nature and their synthetically produced analogues are covered.
At the Third Review Conference in 1991 the Final Declaration11 contained similar language:
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, genetic
engineering and biotechnology, and the possibilities of their use for purposes
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that
the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such
developments.  The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally
covers all microbial agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered,
whatever their origin or method of production.
At the Fourth Review Conference in 1996 the Final Declaration12 was broadened:
The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology,
molecular biology, genetic engineering and any application resulting from genome
studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives
and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the
States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.
13.  At the Fifth Review Conference, it will again be important to include language in the
Final Declaration in relation to relevant scientific and technological developments that
unequivocally reaffirms that the coverage of the prohibition in Article I is all embracing and
                                                
10United Nations, Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, 8th - 26th September 1986, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.II/13/II
11United Nations, Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, 9th - 27th September 1991, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.III/23
12United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, 25th November - 6th December 1996, Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.IV/9
7applies to all such developments.  Examples of relevant scientific and technological
developments that should be addressed relate to bioregulators, which are essential for normal
bodily functions but can cause harm if administered in unusual quantities, to genomics and
bioinformatics and to genetic recombinations.
14.    Little attention has been paid at previous Review Conferences to reaffirmation that the
language in Article I relating to the weapons, equipment and means of delivery:
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins
for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
An issue that has arisen during the Protocol negotiations has related to the use of pests and
vectors.   Whilst there is language within square brackets in the Protocol13 Article I General
Provisions stating that:
[2.  Each State Party to this protocol undertakes not to use pests or vectors as a
method of warfare or for hostile purposes.]
there is much to be said for States Parties addressing this issue through an affirmation in the
Final Declaration of the Fifth Review Conference that the prohibition in Article I on
weapons, equipment and means of delivery applies also to the use of pests and vectors for
hostile purposes or in armed conflict.
15.  Another issue that has arisen during the Protocol negotiations relates to the definition of
"hostile purposes" for which there is language within square brackets in the Protocol Article
II Definitions stating that
[4.  Hostile purposes mean
[Any purpose, which has no prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
intention.]
[4 bis (a) The use of bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons or the threat of use
[by a State] with a view to inflicting military, economic, [moral] or other kind of
damage;
[(b)  Any other purpose, which has no prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
intention.]]]
There are two cases relating to the use of biological agents and toxins for hostile purposes
which could with advantage be taken into account by the Fifth Review Conference in
considering and elaborating their Final Declaration in regard to Article I.  First, relates to the
possible use by a State of biological weapons against the people, animals or crops of a part of
its own territory.  There would be advantage in the Final Declaration affirming that hostile
purposes and armed conflict includes any use of biological or toxin weapons by a State Party
against the people, animals or crops of a part of their territory.   The second case relates to a
                                                
13All language from the Protocol is taken from the latest version in United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad
Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC
GROUP/52 (Part I), 11 August 2000, Geneva.
8particular type of biocontrol which is increasingly being applied, where appropriate, by States
around the world.   This particular type of biocontrol relates to the possible attack of drug
crops by a biological agent.   The programmes carried out by the UN International Drug
Control Programme include programmes for the elimination of illicit crops through the
development of an environmentally safe and reliable biological control agents14.  There
would be advantage in the Final Declaration affirming that the use of biocontrol agents by a
State Party within its own territory is justified for peaceful purposes -- the implication would
be clear that use of biocontrol agents within the territory of a State without the consent of that
State would be in breach of the Convention.
16.  A further issue that needs to be addressed at the Fifth Review Conference in the context
of Article I is that of non-compliance.  This is a difficult issue as it is the non-compliance of
States Parties that is being addressed -- and as those States Parties are participants in the
Review Conference, they can dilute the language adopted for the Final Declaration as
happened in 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference.  It is nevertheless important that
concerns about non-compliance are addressed -- it is unsatisfactory if statements are made, as
by the United States in 1996, that the number of States possessing or seeking to possess
biological weapons had more than doubled since the entry into force of the Convention.
Afterall, when looking back to the Third Review Conference in 1991, there were significant
statements then about the non-compliance of the Soviet Union and Iraq and, in neither case,
have subsequent events resolved the issues satisfactorily.
17.  Finally, the useful strong language agreed in 1996 at the Fourth Review Conference
about the prohibition of use needs to be reaffirmed in the Final Declaration of the Fifth
Review Conference.
Article II
18.  A more difficult issue, but again an opportunity, is for the States Parties to extend their
joint understandings in relation to facilities that have been used in previous offensive
biological weapons programmes.15  The prohibition in the Convention makes it clear that no
State Party shall develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire and retain microbial or
other agents or weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.   Furthermore, under Article II each State
Party undertakes to destroy or divert to peaceful purposes, ...not later than nine months after
entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of
delivery specified in Article I of the Convention.   There is no mention of production facilities
-- in contrast to the Chemical Weapons Convention under which in Article I States Parties
undertake to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities. There would be
considerable benefit from language under Article II in which the Conference affirmed that
facilities used in past offensive programmes have been destroyed or irreversibly converted to
peaceful purposes.
Article III
19.  In this Article each State Party undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever ...
any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of
                                                
14See various documents available at http://www.undcp.org and at http://www.incb.org
15A fuller account of this issue is provided in Graham S. Pearson, Production Facilities: A BTWC/CWC
Discrepancy, Working Paper, Pugwash Meeting no. 258, Geneva, 18-19 November 2000.
9this Convention.  The Fourth Review Conference called for all States Parties to take
appropriate measures to implement this obligation.  Furthermore, it noted that States Parties
should consider ways and means to ensure that individual and subnational groups are
effectively prevented from acquiring, through transfers, biological agents and toxins for other
than peaceful purposes.  At the Fifth Review Conference attention should be given to
strengthening this language given the increased concern expressed in many States about the
possible use of biological agents and toxins by terrorist groups.  There would also be benefit
from considering the measures being adopted internationally to implement the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity under which States require
Advance Informed Agreement prior to the import of genetically modified organisms.
Article IV
20.  Each State Party is obliged under this Article to take appropriate national measures to
prevent and prohibit the development and production of biological weapons.  At the Fourth
Review Conference the States Parties recognized the need to ensure, through the review
and/or adoption of national measures, the effective fulfilment of their obligations under the
Convention in order, inter alia, to exclude use of biological and toxin weapon weapons in
terrorist or criminal activity.   Given the increased concern expressed in many States about
the possible use of biological agents and toxins by terrorist groups, there would be merit in
States Parties giving increased attention to the adoption of national measures.  Whilst there
have been exhortations at successive Review Conferences for States Parties to provide
information to the UN DDA on specific legislation, more needs to be done with this
information which needs to be provided to all States Parties thereby aiding those who have
yet to take appropriate national measures to do so.
21.  It is interesting to note a recent joint initiative by Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Caribbean States, which have little if any chemical
industry, has identified the potential value of an integrated approach to legislation that
addressed both toxic chemicals and pesticides and the implementation of the CWC16.  A
similar integrated approach could well be attractive for similar small States in respect of the
legislation required to implement both the Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity and the future BTWC Protocol.
22.  Since the Fourth Review Conference proposals17 have been made to strengthen the
prohibition regime against biological and chemical weapons through the international
criminalization of work on such weapons by regarding such work as being in the same
category as the crimes of piracy, torture, and hijacking.  The Fifth Review Conference could
usefully encourage further examination of these proposals by the Sixth Committee of the
General Assembly with a view to the negotiation of an international jurisdiction treaty.
23.  At successive Review Conferences, the Conference has noted the importance of inclusion
in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military education programmes of information
dealing with the prohibitions and provisions contained in the ... Convention.   It is, however,
apparent that there is a real need for a global outreach programme to ensure that all medical,
                                                
16Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, An Integrated Approach to National Implementing
Legislation:  Model Act developed by the Secretariat of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, External
Relations Division, Office of the Legal Adviser, S/190/2000, 23 May 2000.
17CBW Conventions Bulletin, A Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons under
International Criminal Law, Issue No. 42, December 1998, pp.1-5.
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scientific and military personnel are aware of the prohibitions of the Convention.   Given the
potential of the internet, it should be possible in the 21st Century to mount a more effective
campaign to achieve this awareness raising.
Article V
24.  Under this Article, States Parties undertake to consult one another and to cooperate in
solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of
the provisions of, the Convention.   The confidence-building measures (CBMs) agreed at the
Review Conference in 1986 and extended and strengthened in 1991 come under this Article.
At the Fourth Review Conference in 1996, little attention was paid, because of the ongoing
Ad Hoc Group consideration of a Protocol, to the CBMs other than to continue to urge all
States Parties to complete full and timely declarations in the future.   At the Fifth Review
Conference, the outcome of the Protocol negotiations will be apparent and it will be timely
and appropriate to give more detailed consideration to the quality of the information provided
under the CBMs as these obligations will continue for all States Parties.   It is evident that
there is much variation between States Parties in the attention given to provision of
information under the politically binding CBMs and it will be appropriate to examine how the
quality of the information provided can be both harmonised and upgraded.  There would be
considerable benefit from making the CBM information more widely available as it is clear to
those engaged in the field that some of the information is inaccurate -- which hardly
contributes to building confidence.
25.  In addition, given that the negotiation of the Protocol is nearing completion, there are
clear benefits from initially the Provisional Technical Secretariat and subsequently the future
Organization being required to process, translate and analyse CBM information and circulate
this to States Parties as this analysis would enable the Provisional Technical Secretariat to
plan more effectively for the eventual entry into force of the Protocol.  This analysis and
distribution of CBM information could be achieved through imaginative drafting of the
resolution establishing the PrepCom.
26.  As the Protocol is nearing completion, it is also timely to start to give consideration to
the future of the CBMs which will continue to be politically binding on all States Parties until
a Review Conference decides otherwise.  As several of the CBMs are effectively being
incorporated into the Protocol, there will come a time after entry into force of the Protocol
there will be duplicate reporting with closely similar information being provided under some
of the Protocol declarations and under some of the CBMs.  When the Protocol has been
finalised, consideration could then be given to what the continuing obligations in regard of
the current CBMs should be after entry into force on the States Parties to the Convention who
are also party to the Protocol.
27.  Another topic for consideration under Article V are the procedures to strengthen the
implementation of Article V which were adopted at the Third Review Conference and which,
it was noted at the Fourth Review Conference, had not yet been invoked.  They were invoked
by Cuba in 1997 in respect of the outbreak of Thrips palmi in Cuba and it will be appropriate
at the Fifth Review Conference to examine and review the procedures.  One point that might
usefully be considered is the provision of information to the public as it is important for the
strength of the Convention that it is publically known that it is alive and functioning well --
and this relates across to the public awareness campaign needed under Article IV.   There is
little point in raising public awareness if the operations of the Convention are cloaked in
secrecy as the benefits accruing from the Convention will not be evident.
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Article IX
28.  This recognises the importance of effective prohibition of chemical weapons.  At the
Fourth Review Conference, the Final Declaration noted that the Chemical Weapons
Convention would enter into force on 29 April 1997.   At the Fifth Review Conference it will
be appropriate to note that the First Review Conference of the CWC will take place in the
following year, 2002, and it will be important to ensure that there are no gaps -- or perceived
gaps -- between the prohibitions under the general purpose criteria in the two Conventions.
As both Conventions address toxins and other substances within the region between chemical
and biological agents, it will be beneficial to ensure that the two series of Review
Conferences are aware of each other's developments.
Article X
29.  Under this Article, States Parties undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate
in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological
information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful
purposes.  At previous Review Conferences there has been much discussion leading to a
lengthy statement in the Final Declaration but without significant subsequent action.  For
example, the Fourth Review Conference requested the Secretary-General to collate on an
annual basis, and for the information of States Parties, reports on how this article is being
implemented.  No such reports have appeared, probably, in part or wholly, due to an absence
of agreement as to what information should be provided by States Parties to the Secretary-
General to enable such a report to be prepared.  The period since the Fourth Review
Conference has seen continued intensive discussion in the Ad Hoc Group negotiations of
specific measures to implement Article X and it is evident that Article VII of the Protocol has
successfully identified a range of specific measures that will meet this objective.  In addition,
it has become evident that there are several initiatives in other fora such as the improvement
of biosafety standards worldwide which require the setting up of national competent
authorities and a system of inspections of facilities which will over time contribute to
improved safety, health, prosperity and security.   Consequently, it will be necessary to focus
under the Convention and Protocol on those activities for which the future Organization is
best fitted to carry out avoiding unnecessary duplication.
Concluding Remarks
30.  There is a real opportunity for the Fifth Review Conference to significantly strengthen
and enhance the regime for the total prohibition and elimination of biological and toxin
weapons through extended understandings enshrined in the Final Declaration. To achieve this
strengthening requires the provision of information to all States Parties so that they can judge
for themselves the benefits that such extended understandings would bring.  An effective
Review Conference together with a completed and effective Protocol will set the scene for a
safer and more secure 21st Century in which the international norm against the use of disease
as a weapon of war against humans, animals and plants has been significantly strengthened.
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ANNEX
FINAL DECLARATION OF THE FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE, 1996
Final Document BWC/CONF.IV/9
PART II
II. FINAL DECLARATION
THE STATES PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE
DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL
(BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, WHICH
MET IN GENEVA FROM 25 NOVEMBER TO 6 DECEMBER 1996 TO REVIEW THE
OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION, SOLEMNLY DECLARE:
- Their conviction that the Convention is essential to international peace and security;
- Their reaffirmation of their determination to act with a view to achieving effective
progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and
elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and their conviction that the
prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and
bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective
measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control;
- Their reaffirmation that under any circumstances the use, development, production
and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons is effectively
prohibited under Article I of the Convention.
- Their continued determination, for the sake of mankind, to exclude completely the
possibility of the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons, and
their conviction that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind; 
- Their reaffirmation of their firm commitment to the purposes of the Preamble and
the provisions of the Convention, and of their belief that universal adherence to the
Convention would enhance international peace and security;
- Their determination to enhance the implementation and effectiveness of the
Convention and to further strengthen its authority, including through the confidence-
building measures and agreed procedures for consultations agreed by the Second and
Third Review Conferences, and through the fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to the
Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Conference in 1994;
- Their recognition that effective verification could reinforce the Convention;
- Their conviction that the full implementation of the provisions of the Convention
should facilitate economic and technological development and international
cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities;
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- Their recognition that purposes of this Convention include the prohibition of the use
of biological weapons as contrary to the purpose of the Convention.
The States Parties recognize that the important principles contained in this Solemn
Declaration can also serve as a basis for further strengthening of the Convention.
Preamble
The Conference reaffirms the importance of the elements in review of the Preamble to the
Convention contained in the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the States
Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.
Article I 
1. The Conference notes the importance of Article I as the provision which defines the scope
of the Convention. The Conference reaffirms its support for the provisions of this Article. 
2. The Conference reaffirms that the Convention prohibits the development, production,
stockpiling, other acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins
harmful to plants and animals, as well as humans, of types and in quantities that have no
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.
3. The Conference reaffirms that the use by the States Parties, in any way and under any
circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of Article I of
the Convention. 
4. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking in Article I never in any circumstances to
develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain weapons, equipment or means of
delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict, in
order to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their use.
5. The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial or
other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, as well as their
components, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that
have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. 
6. The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and
technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, biotechnology,
molecular biology, genetic engineering, and any applications resulting from genome studies,
and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives and the
provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the States Parties in
Article I applies to all such developments. 
7. The Conference notes that experimentation involving open-air release of pathogens or
toxins harmful to man, animals or plants that have no justification for prophylactic, protective
or other peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the undertakings contained in Article I. 
8. The Conference appeals through the States Parties to their scientific communities to lend
their support only to activities that have justification for prophylactic, protective and other
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peaceful purposes, and refrain from undertaking or supporting activities which are in breach
of the obligations deriving from provisions of the Convention.
9. The Conference emphasizes, once more, the vital importance of full implementation by all
States Parties of all the provisions of the Convention, especially Articles I, II and III. The
Conference agrees that the application by States Parties of positive approaches in accordance
with the provisions of the Convention is in the interest of all States Parties and that any non-
compliance with its provisions could undermine confidence in the Convention. Non-
compliance should be treated with determination in all cases, without selectivity or
discrimination. 
Article II
1. The Conference recognizes that for any State acceding to the Convention after the entry
into force of the Convention, the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes specified in
Article II would be completed upon accession to the Convention. The Conference emphasizes
that the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes specified in Article II should be carried
out completely and effectively.
2. The Conference notes the importance of Article II and welcomes the statements made by
States which have become Parties to the Convention since the Third Review Conference that
they do not possess agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery referred to in
Article I of the Convention. 
3. The Conference notes that the submission to the Centre for Disarmament Affairs of
appropriate information on destruction by States Parties which had stockpiles and have
destroyed them in fulfilment of their Article II obligations and which have not already made
such submissions could enhance confidence in the Convention and its objectives.
4. The Conference stresses that States which become Parties to the Convention, implementing
the provisions of this Article, shall observe all necessary safety precautions to protect
populations and the environment.
Article III 
1. The Conference notes the importance of Article III and welcomes the statements which
States that have acceded to the Convention have made to the effect that they have not
transferred agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery as specified in Article I
of the Convention, to any recipient whatsoever and have not furnished assistance,
encouragement or inducement to any State, group of States or international organizations to
manufacture or otherwise acquire them. The Conference affirms that Article III is sufficiently
comprehensive to cover any recipient whatsoever at international, national or subnational
levels.
2. The Conference notes that a number of States Parties stated that they have already taken
concrete measures to give effect to their undertakings under this Article and in this context
also notes statements made by States Parties at the Conference about the legislative or
administrative measures they have taken since the Third Review Conference. The Conference
calls for appropriate measures by all States Parties. Transfers relevant to the Convention
should be authorized only when the intended use is for purposes not prohibited under the
Convention. 
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3. The Conference discussed the question whether multilaterally-agreed guidelines or
multilateral guidelines negotiated by all States Parties to the Convention concerning the
transfer of biological agents, materials and technology for peaceful purposes to any recipient
whatsoever might strengthen the Convention. In the development of implementation of
Article III, the Conference notes that States Parties should also consider ways and means to
ensure that individuals or subnational groups are effectively prevented from acquiring,
through transfers, biological agents and toxins for other than peaceful purposes. The
Conference notes that these issues are being considered as part of the ongoing process of
strengthening the Convention. 
4. The Conference reiterates that the provisions of this Article should not be used to impose
restrictions and/or limitations on the transfers for purposes consistent with the objectives and
purposes of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials
under Article X. 
Article IV
1. The Conference underlines the importance of Article IV. It reaffirms the commitment of
States Parties to take the necessary national measures under this Article, in accordance with
their constitutional processes. These measures are to ensure the prohibition and prevention of
the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention anywhere
within their territory, under their jurisdiction or under their control, in order to prevent their
use for purposes contrary to the Convention. The States Parties recognize the need to ensure,
through the review and/or adoption of national measures, the effective fulfilment of their
obligations under the Convention in order, inter alia, to exclude use of biological and toxin
weapons in terrorist or criminal activity. 
2. The Conference notes those measures already taken by a number of States Parties in this
regard, for example the adoption of penal legislation, and reiterates its call to any State Party
that has not yet taken any necessary measures to do so immediately, in accordance with its
constitutional processes. Such measures should apply within its territory, under its
jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. The Conference invites each State Party to
consider, if constitutionally possible and in conformity with international law, the application
of such measures also to actions taken anywhere by natural persons possessing its nationality.
3. The Conference notes the importance of:
- Legislative, administrative and other measures designed to enhance domestic
compliance with the Convention;
- Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to prevent
unauthorized access to and removal of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins: 
- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military education programmes
of information dealing with the prohibitions and provisions contained in the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
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4. The Conference believes that such measures which States Parties might undertake in
accordance with their constitutional processes would strengthen the effectiveness of the
Convention, as requested by the Second and Third Review Conferences.
5. The Conference notes that some States Parties, as requested by the Second Review
Conference, have provided to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs
information on the texts of specific legislation enacted or other measures taken to assure
domestic compliance with the Convention. The Conference invites these States Parties, and
encourages all States Parties, to provide such information and texts in the future. In this
regard the Conference welcomes information provided by States Parties in response to the
confidence-building measure agreed to at the Third Review Conference entitled "Declaration
of legislation, regulations and other measures". In addition, the Conference encourages all
States Parties to provide any useful information on the implementation of such measures.
6. The Conference encourages cooperation and initiatives, including regional ones, towards
the strengthening and implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
regime.
7. The Conference reaffirms that under all circumstances the use of bacteriological
(biological) and toxin weapons is effectively prohibited by the Convention.
Article V
1. The Conference notes the importance of Article V and reaffirms the obligation assumed by
States Parties to consult and cooperate with one another in solving any problems which may
arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.
The Conference reiterates its appeal to States Parties made at the Third Review Conference to
make all possible efforts to solve any problems which may arise in relation to the objective
of, or in the application of the provisions of the Convention with a view towards encouraging
strict observance of the provisions subscribed to. The Conference notes that this Article
provides an appropriate framework for resolving any such problems, and reaffirms that any
State Party which identifies such a problem should, as a rule, use these procedures to address
and resolve it.
2. The Conference also reviewed the operation of the procedures to strengthen the
implementation of the provisions of Article V which were adopted in the Final Declaration of
the Third Review Conference and which built on the agreements reached at the Second
Review Conference. While noting that these procedures have not yet been invoked, the
Conference reaffirmed their present validity. The Conference calls on any State Party which
identifies a problem arising in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the
provisions of the Convention to use these procedures, if appropriate, to address and resolve it.
3. The Conference reaffirms that consultation and cooperation pursuant to this Article may
also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the
United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.
4. In accordance with the decision of the Third Review Conference, the Conference reviewed
the effectiveness of the confidence-building measures as agreed in the Final Declaration of
the Third Review Conference. The Conference notes the continued importance of the
confidence-building measures agreed upon at the Second and Third Review Conferences, as
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well as the modalities elaborated by the Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts
from States Parties to the Convention, held in 1987.
5. The Conference notes the background information document prepared by the United
Nations Secretary-General providing data on the participation of States Parties in the agreed
confidence-building measures since the Third Review Conference. The Conference welcomes
the exchange of information carried out under the confidence-building measures, and notes
that this has contributed to enhancing transparency and building confidence. The Conference
recognizes that participation in the confidence-building measures since the last Review
Conference has not been universal, and that not all responses have been prompt or complete.
In this regard, the Conference also recognizes the technical difficulties experienced by some
States Parties with respect to preparing CBM responses. In this regard, the Conference urges
all States Parties to complete full and timely declarations in the future. The Conference notes
that the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties established by the Special Conference in 1994 is, as
part of its continuing work, considering the incorporation of existing and further enhanced
confidence-building and transparency measures, as appropriate, in a regime to strengthen the
Convention. 
6. The Conference stresses its determination to strengthen effectiveness and improve the
implementation of the Convention, and its recognition that effective verification could
reinforce the Convention. 
7. In this regard, the Conference recalls that: 
- The Third Review Conference established the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental
Experts open to all States Parties to identify and examine potential verification
measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. 
- The Group held four sessions in 1992-1993 and circulated its report to all States
Parties in September 1993. 
- A Special Conference was held in September 1994 to consider the report, and
decided to establish an Ad Hoc Group open to all States Parties. The Conference
considered the work of the Ad Hoc Group under agenda item 12 and its conclusions
are reflected in the section of this document entitled "Consideration of the work of the
Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Conference in 1994".
8. The Conference stresses the need for all States Parties to deal effectively with compliance
issues. In this connection, the States Parties had agreed to provide a specific, timely response
to any compliance concern alleging a breach of their obligations under the Convention. Such
responses should be submitted in accordance with the procedures agreed upon by the Second
Review Conference and further developed by the Third Review Conference. The Conference
reiterates its request that information on such efforts be provided to the Review Conferences.
Article VI
1. The Conference notes that the provisions of this Article have not been invoked.
2. The Conference reaffirms the importance of Article VI, which, in addition to the
procedures contained in Article V, provides that any State Party which finds that any other
State Party is acting in breach of its obligations under the Convention may lodge a complaint
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with the United Nations Security Council. The Conference notes that the provisions of Article
VI will be taken into account, as appropriate, for any future verification regime resulting from
the consideration by the Ad Hoc Group of a system of measures to promote compliance with
the Convention. The Conference emphasizes the provision of Article VI that such a complaint
should include all possible evidence confirming its validity. It stresses that, as in the case of
the implementation of all the provisions and procedures set forth in the Convention, the
procedures foreseen in Article VI should be implemented in good faith within the scope of
the Convention.
3. The Conference invites the Security Council to consider immediately any complaint lodged
under Article VI and to initiate any measures it considers necessary for the investigation of
the complaint in accordance with the Charter. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of
each State Party to cooperate in carrying out any investigations which the Security Council
may initiate.
4. The Conference recalls, in this context, United Nations Security Council
resolution 620 (1988), which at the time encouraged the United Nations Secretary-General to
carry out prompt investigations, in response to allegations brought to its attention by any
Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or
toxin weapons that could entail a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or of any other
applicable rule of international treaty or customary law. The Conference also recalls the
technical guidelines and procedures contained in Annex I of United Nations
document A/44/561 to guide the United Nations Secretary-General on the timely and efficient
investigation of reports of the possible use of such weapons. The States Parties reaffirm their
agreement to consult, at the request of any State Party, regarding allegations of use or threat
of use of bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons and to cooperate fully with the
United Nations Secretary-General in carrying out such investigations. The Conference
stresses that in the case of alleged use the United Nations is called upon to take appropriate
measures expeditiously, which could include a request to the Security Council to consider
action in accordance with the Charter.
5. The Conference invites the Security Council to inform each State Party of the results of any
investigation initiated under Article VI and to consider promptly any appropriate further
action which may be necessary.
6. The Conference notes that the procedure outlined in this Article is without prejudice to the
prerogative of the States Parties to the Convention to consider jointly the cases of alleged
non-compliance with the provisions of the Convention and to make appropriate decisions in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable rules of international law. 
7. The Conference notes that provisions for investigating alleged breaches of the Convention,
including measures for the investigation of alleged use of biological and toxin weapons,
continue to be considered by the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties, in accordance with its
mandate.
Article VII
1. The Conference notes with satisfaction that these provisions have not been invoked.
2. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking made by each State Party to provide or support
assistance in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to any Party to the
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Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been
exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.
3. The Conference takes note of desires expressed that, should a request for assistance be
made, it be promptly considered and an appropriate response provided. In this context,
pending consideration of a decision by the Security Council, timely emergency assistance
could be provided by States Parties if requested. 
4. The Conference takes note of the proposal that the Ad Hoc Group might need to discuss
the detailed procedure for assistance in order to ensure that timely emergency assistance
would be provided by States Parties if requested.
5. The Conference considers that in the event that this Article might be invoked, the United
Nations, with the help of appropriate intergovernmental organizations such as the World
Health Organization (WHO), could play a coordinating role.
Article VIII
1. The Conference reaffirms the importance of Article VIII and stresses the importance of the
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.
2. The Conference acknowledges that the 1925 Geneva Protocol, by prohibiting the use of
bacteriological methods of warfare, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
complement each other.
3. The Conference reaffirms that nothing contained in the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations
assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
4. Noting the actions in support of the Protocol taken by the Security Council and General
Assembly of the United Nations, through Security Council resolution 620 (1988) and General
Assembly resolutions 41/58 C, 42/37 C, 43/74 A, 44/115 B and 45/57 C and recalling the
solemn reaffirmation of the prohibition as established in the Protocol, issued by the
Conference of the States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other interested States held
in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, the Conference appeals to all States Parties to the Geneva
Protocol to fulfil their obligations assumed under the Protocol and urges all States not yet
Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to accede to it without delay.
5. The Conference stresses the importance of the withdrawal of all reservations to the 1925
Geneva Protocol related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
6. The Conference welcomes the actions which States Parties have taken to withdraw their
reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol related to the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, and calls upon those States Parties that continue to maintain pertinent
reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to withdraw those reservations, and to notify the
Depositary of the 1925 Geneva Protocol of their withdrawals without delay. 
7. The Conference notes that reservations concerning retaliation, through the use of any of the
objects prohibited by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, even conditional, are
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totally incompatible with the absolute and universal prohibition of the development,
production, stockpiling, acquisition and retention of bacteriological (biological) and toxin
weapons, with the aim to exclude completely and forever the possibility of their use.
Article IX
1. The Conference reaffirms that Article IX identifies the recognized objective of effective
prohibition of chemical weapons. The Conference welcomes conclusion of the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on Their Destruction, which was opened for signature on 13-15 January 1993 in Paris. 
2. The Conference welcomes the fact that sixty-five instruments of ratification have now been
deposited, and that the Convention will therefore enter into force on 29 April 1997. 
3. The Conference stresses the importance to the Convention that all possessors of chemical
weapons, chemical weapons production facilities or chemical weapons development facilities
should be among the original parties to the Convention and, in this context, the importance of
the United States of America and the Russian Federation, having declared possession of
chemical weapons, being among the original States Parties to the Convention. 
4. The Conference calls upon all States that have not yet done so to sign and/or ratify the
Convention without delay. 
5. The Conference notes that the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, at its fourteenth session (22-26 July 1996) entrusted the
Chairman of the Commission, in close consultation with its member States, with the task of
convening, as necessitated by circumstances in connection with the occurrence of the trigger
point, a meeting of the Commission to provide appropriate guidance.
Article X
1. The Conference once more emphasizes the increasing importance of the provisions of
Article X, especially in the light of recent scientific and technological developments in the
field of biotechnology, bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins with peaceful
applications, which have vastly increased the potential for cooperation between States to help
promote economic and social development, and scientific and technological progress,
particularly in the developing countries, in conformity with their interests, needs and
priorities.
2. The Conference, while acknowledging what has already been done towards this end, notes
with concern the increasing gap between the developed and the developing countries in the
field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas. The
Conference urges all States Parties actively to continue to promote international cooperation
and exchange with States Parties in the peaceful uses of biotechnology, and urges all States
Parties possessing advanced biotechnology to adopt positive measures to promote technology
transfer and international cooperation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in particular
with the developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind. At the same time, the
Conference stresses that measures to implement Article X need to be consistent with the
objectives and provisions of the Convention. 
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3. The Conference recalls that the States Parties have a legal obligation to facilitate and have
the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific
and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for
peaceful purposes and not to hamper the economic and technological development of States
Parties.
4. The Conference emphasizes that States Parties should not use the provisions of the
Convention to impose restrictions and/or limitations on transfers for purposes consistent with
the objectives and provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology,
equipment and materials.
5. The Conference notes that existing institutional ways and means of ensuring multilateral
cooperation between the developed and developing countries would need to be developed
further in order to promote international cooperation in peaceful activities in such areas as
medicine, public health and agriculture. 
6. The Conference reiterates its call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to
propose for inclusion on the agenda of a relevant United Nations body, before the next
Review Conference, a discussion and examination of the means of improving institutional
mechanisms in order to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and
scientific and technological information regarding the use of bacteriological (biological)
agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.
7. The Conference recommends that invitations to participate in this discussion and
examination should be extended to all States Parties, whether or not they are members of the
United Nations or concerned specialized agencies.
8. The Conference, at the same time, notes that the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties was
mandated by the Special Conference in September 1994 to consider specific measures
designed to ensure effective and full implementation of Article X, which also avoid any
restrictions incompatible with the obligations undertaken under the Convention, emphasizing
that the provisions of the Convention should not be used to impose restrictions and/or
limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of
the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials.
9. The Conference takes note of the significant steps forward in promoting cooperation in the
biological field taken by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, including the adoption of Agenda 21 and the Rio
Declaration, and by the Convention on Biological Diversity, and underlines their importance
in the context of Article X implementation.
10. The Conference shares the worldwide concern about new, emerging and re-emerging
infectious diseases and considers that the international response to them offers opportunities
for increased cooperation in the context of Article X application and of strengthening the
Convention. The Conference welcomes the efforts to establish a system of global monitoring
of disease and encourages States Parties to support the World Health Organization, including
its relevant newly established division, the FAO and the OIE, in these efforts directed at
assisting Member States to strengthen national and local programmes of surveillance for
infectious diseases and improve early notification, surveillance, control and response
capabilities. 
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11. The Conference urges the use of existing institutional means within the United Nations
system and the full utilization of the possibilities provided by the specialized agencies and
other international organizations, and considers that the implementation of Article X could be
enhanced through greater coordination among international cooperation programmes in the
biological field for peaceful purposes conducted by States Parties, specialized agencies and
other international organizations. 
12. The Conference urges States Parties, the United Nations and its specialized agencies to
take further specific measures within their competence for the promotion of the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for
the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes and of
international cooperation in this field. Such measures could include, inter alia: 
1. Transfer and exchange of information concerning research programmes in
biosciences and greater cooperation in international public health and disease control;
2. Wider transfer and exchange of information, materials and equipment among States
on a systematic and long-term basis;
3. Active promotion of contacts between scientists and technical personnel on a
reciprocal basis, in relevant fields; 
4. Increased technical cooperation and assistance, including training programmes to
developing countries in the use of biosciences and genetic engineering for peaceful
purposes through active association with United Nations institutions, including the
International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB);
5. Facilitating the conclusion of bilateral, regional and multiregional agreements
providing, on a mutually advantageous, equal and non-discriminatory basis, for their
participation in the development and application of biotechnology;
6. Encouraging the coordination of national and regional programmes and working
out in an appropriate manner the ways and means of cooperation in this field;
7. Cooperation in providing information on their national epidemiological
surveillance and data reporting systems, and in providing assistance, on a bilateral
level and/or in conjunction with WHO, FAO and OIE regarding epidemiological and
epizootical surveillance, with a view to improvements in the identification and timely
reporting of significant outbreaks of human and animal diseases;
8. The promotion of programmes for the exchange and training of scientists and
experts, and the exchange of scientific and technical information in the biological
field between developed and developing countries. 
13. The Conference considers that a worldwide data bank might be a suitable way of
facilitating the flow of information in the field of genetic engineering, biotechnology and
other scientific developments. In this context, the Conference underlines the importance of
monitoring all related developments in the field of frontier science and high technology in the
areas relevant to the Convention.
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14. The Conference requests the Secretary-General to collate on an annual basis, and for the
information of States Parties, reports on how this article is being implemented.
15. The Conference welcomes the information provided by a number of States Parties on the
cooperative measures they have undertaken towards fulfilling their Article X obligations and
encourages States Parties in a position to do so to provide such information.
16. The Conference welcomes efforts to elaborate an international programme of vaccine
development for the prevention of diseases which would involve the scientific and technical
personnel from developing countries that are States Parties to the Convention. The
Conference recognizes that such a programme will not only enhance peaceful international
cooperation in biotechnology but also contribute to improving health care in developing
countries, assist in establishing systems for worldwide monitoring of communicable diseases,
and provide transparency in accordance with the Convention. 
17. The Conference calls upon all States Parties in a position to do so to fully cooperate with
the developing States Parties to the Convention in the area of promotion and financing the
establishment of vaccine production facilities. The Conference recommends further that the
relevant multilateral organizations and world financial institutions provide assistance for
establishment and promotion of vaccine production projects in these countries.
Article XI
1. The Conference notes that the Islamic Republic of Iran has formally presented a proposal
to amend Article I and the title of the Convention to include explicitly the prohibition of use
of biological weapons.
2. The Conference notes that the Depositaries are notifying all States Parties of the proposal.
The Conference encourages all States Parties to convey their views to the Depositaries on
whether the Convention needs to be amended to make clear explicitly that the use of
biological weapons is effectively prohibited. 
3. The Conference requests the Depositaries to take such measures as may be requested by a
majority of States Parties, including the option of convening a conference open to all States
Parties to the Convention at the earliest appropriate opportunity to take a decision on the
proposal, should a majority of the States Parties so decide.
4. The Conference meanwhile reaffirms the importance of Article XI. In this context the
Conference underlines that the provisions of Article XI should in principle be implemented in
such a way as not to affect the universality of the Convention. 
Article XII
1. The Conference decides that a Fifth Review Conference shall be held in Geneva at the
request of the majority of States Parties, or in any case, not later than 2001. 
2. The Conference decides that the Fifth Review Conference shall consider, inter alia, 
- The impact of scientific and technological developments relating to the Convention;
24
- The relevance of the provisions of, and the implementation of the Chemical
Weapons Convention on the effective implementation of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, duly taking into account the degree of universality attained by
such conventions at the time of the Fifth Review Conference;
- The effectiveness of confidence-building measures as agreed at the Second and
Third Review Conferences;
- The conclusions of a Special Conference, to which the Ad Hoc Group shall submit
its report, including a legally-binding instrument to strengthen the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention, which shall be adopted by consensus, to be held as soon
as possible before the commencement of the Fifth Review Conference; and further
action as appropriate;
- The requirement for, and the operation of, the requested allocation by the United
Nations Secretary-General of staff resources and other requirements to assist the
effective implementation of the relevant decisions of the Fourth Review Conference;
3. The Review Conference recommends that conferences of States Parties to review the
operation of the Convention should be held at least every five years. 
Article XIII
1. The Conference notes the provisions of Article XIII and, while emphasizing that the
Convention is of unlimited duration and applies at all times, expresses its satisfaction that no
State Party to the Convention has exercised its right to withdraw from the Convention.
Article XIV
1. The Conference notes with satisfaction that a number of States have acceded to the
Convention since the Third Review Conference.
2. The Convention calls upon States which have not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention
to do so without delay and upon those States which have not signed the Convention to join
the States Parties thereto, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the
Convention.
3. In this connection, the Conference requests States Parties to encourage wider adherence to
the Convention.
4. The Conference particularly welcomes regional initiatives that would lead to wider
accession to the Convention. 
5. The Fourth Review Conference appeals to those States Parties to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention which have taken part in the Conference to participate in the
implementation of provisions contained in the Final Declaration of this Conference. The
Conference also appeals to all States Parties to participate actively in the Ad Hoc Group of
States Parties, with a view to the early completion of its work to strengthen the Convention.
Article XV
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The Conference notes the importance of this Article as well as the importance of the legal
status of the languages of the Convention and United Nations system in the work of the Ad
Hoc Group established by the Special Conference in 1994. 
Consideration of the work of the Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Conference
in 1994
The Conference welcomes the report on the progress of the Ad Hoc Group as contained in
BWC/AD HOC GROUP/32 and notes in particular the following: 
- The Special Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (September 1994) agreed to 
establish an Ad Hoc Group open to all States Parties to consider appropriate
measures, including possible verification measures, and draft proposals to strengthen
the Convention.
- Since its establishment, the Ad Hoc Group has held one short organizational session
and four substantive sessions of a duration of two weeks each.
- In accordance with its mandate, as contained in the Final Report of the Special
Conference (BBC/SPCONF/1), the Ad Hoc Group has been considering appropriate
measures, including possible verification measures, to strengthen the Convention.
Where relevant, consideration of issues has sought to build on the considerable body
of technical work connected with strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention regime undertaken by the Ad Hoc Group of Technical Experts to Identify
and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical
Standpoint (VEREX) in 1992 and 1993.
- The Ad Hoc Group has made significant progress towards fulfilling the mandate
given by the Special Conference, including by identifying a preliminary framework
and elaborating potential basic elements of a legally-binding instrument to strengthen
the Convention.
- Nevertheless, the Ad Hoc Group was not able to complete its work and submit its
report including a draft of the future legally-binding instrument to the States Parties
for consideration at the Fourth Review Conference. In this context it is noted that the
cumulative period allocated to substantive negotiations in the Ad Hoc Group has been
eight weeks.
The Conference welcomes the decision of the Ad Hoc Group, in order to fulfil its mandate, to
intensify its work with a view to completing it as soon as possible before the commencement
of the Fifth Review Conference and submit its report, which shall be adopted by consensus,
to the States Parties, to be considered at a Special Conference. The Conference encourages
the Ad Hoc Group to review its method of work and to move to a negotiating format in order
to fulfil its mandate.
The Conference notes that the Ad Hoc Group is considering, as part of its continuing work,
definitions of terms and objective criteria, such as lists of bacteriological (biological) agents
and toxins, their threshold quantities, as well as equipment and types of activities, where
relevant for specific measures designed to strengthen the Convention.
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